IBC Landmark SeriesONE JUDGMENT · THREE SEATS
IBC Landmark Series A new way to read judgments
No. 5 of 100
s. 10A · ss. 7, 9 & 10
Choose your seat in the courtroom
One judgment.
Three seats.

The case where the law changed mid-game — and still won. Sit in the Gallery for a ₹104-crore resignation and a petition killed by a law born three weeks after it was filed. Step up to the Bar for the COVID window and the date that decides everything. Take the Bench for the over-readings already loose in the market.

Ramesh Kymal v. Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power Pvt. Ltd.

Civil Appeal No. 4050 of 2020 · Supreme Court of India · 09.02.2021 · Dr D.Y. Chandrachud & M.R. Shah, JJ. (per Chandrachud, J.)
✓ Every quote verbatim · certified copy, 19 pp. · verified 22.09.2026

Most readers start in the Gallery — and climb before they realise it.

Provisions s. 10A · ss. 7, 9 & 10 IBC Question can a COVID-window default ever reach the NCLT? Outcome “The appeal is accordingly dismissed” · Para 27
Seat one · five minutes · no legal vocabulary

The Gallery

Every great case is first a great story. This one has a chairman’s ₹104-crore exit, a country locked down overnight — and a law that reached three weeks into the past to kill a case already in court.

1

The exit. January 2020: the chairman and managing director of wind-energy giant Siemens Gamesa’s Indian arm resigns — and claims about ₹104 crore under his employment and incentive agreements. The company asks him to stay on through April while they part ways.

2

The world stops. 25 March 2020: a nationwide lockdown begins. Businesses freeze, payments freeze — and somewhere in Delhi, lawmakers begin drafting an emergency shield for companies about to drown in insolvency petitions.

3

The race. 28 April: the company sends him a termination letter. 30 April: he fires back a formal demand notice — naming, in the statutory form, 30 April 2020 as the date his dues went unpaid. On 11 May he files an insolvency petition. The shield law doesn’t exist yet. He looks safely inside the door.

4

The law changes mid-game. 5 June 2020: an Ordinance inserts Section 10A into the Code — no insolvency petitions for any default arising on or after 25 March 2020, for six months (later stretched to a year). And a proviso with teeth: for those defaults, no petition shall ever be filed.

5

The three escapes. He argues: first, I filed before 5 June — a new law can’t reach a case already in court; second, my “real” default was in January or March, before the cut-off; third, this claim has nothing to do with COVID anyway.

6

The verdict — all three fail. The bar runs on when the default happened, not when the petition was filed — otherwise everyone who rushed to court before 5 June would escape the very protection Parliament built. His own demand notice fixed the date: 30 April, inside the window. And no court will hold an inquest into whether COVID truly caused the default. Petition dead (9 February 2021).

Epilogue — the door closed, the debt lived. Section 10A never forgave a rupee: the ₹104-crore claim stayed alive for ordinary courts — only the insolvency weapon was taken away. The COVID window (25 March 2020 to 24 March 2021) is now permanent legal geography: any default dated inside it can never open the Code’s door — and every limitation and default-date fight since checks this map first.

Six words the rest of this page uses
Section 10A — the COVID suspension: no insolvency petitions for defaults arising on or after 25 March 2020, for six months (extended to one year).
Ordinance — an emergency law made by the President when Parliament isn’t sitting; this one arrived 5 June 2020 and later became an Act.
Date of default — the day payment became due and wasn’t made. The single fact on which s. 10A turns.
Demand notice (Form 3) — the operational creditor’s formal notice; the default date declared in it binds its maker.
Retrospective — a law reaching back to events before its birth; s. 10A reaches back from 5 June to 25 March 2020.
Initiation v. commencement — filing date versus admission date (ss. 5(11)–(12)); neither distinction rescues a barred default.
Gallery check He filed his petition three weeks before Section 10A existed — yet it was barred. Can you say why in one sentence?

Because the ban looks at the default, not the filing: Parliament barred petitions for any default arising on or after 25 March 2020 — and his own demand notice declared the default date as 30 April 2020, squarely inside the protected window.

The deeper logic: if filing early could beat the ban, every creditor who raced to court between 25 March and 5 June would strip companies of exactly the protection the lockdown law was built to give. The shield had to reach back to work at all.

▲ Rise when ready
“A petition, validly filed under the law of its day, was killed by a law born three weeks later — and the Supreme Court called that the only reading possible. The reasoning is a masterclass in how purpose beats text.”
Step up to the Bar ↓ or stop here — the story is complete in itself, and you know how it ended.
Seat two · twelve minutes · the law itself

The Bar

Now you argue it. Three questions, the window and the anchors in one interactive chart, five holdings — each split into our reading and the Court’s verbatim words, para-numbered from the certified copy.

Bar · 1

The three questions the Court actually answered

A judgment is authority only for what it decides. Fix the questions before you read a single answer.

Q1

The reach-back: does s. 10A bar an application filed before 5 June 2020 (its date of birth), where the default arose after 25 March 2020 — is the bar retrospective?

Q2

The anchor: can the applicant escape by re-dating the default to before the cut-off, contrary to the date declared in his own Form 3 demand notice?

Q3

The causation escape: must the tribunal examine whether the default was actually caused by the COVID-19 pandemic before applying the bar?

Bar · 2

The window, the bar, the anchors — explore them

The chart in one sentence: five dates decided the case (the Window), one question decides every case — when did the default arise? (the Bar) — and three escape routes all failed (the Anchors). Click anything, or let it walk you through.
black arrows = the paths · red = the window and the arguments that died in it · ✖ = the escapes that failed · everything in quotes is verbatim from the certified copy (Paras 1–28)
Bar · 3

The five holdings — what you may cite as law

Two layers, so you always know whose voice you are reading: Our reading is this page’s interpretation — we state it and we stand behind it. The Court is the judgment verbatim, para-numbered from the certified copy.

Ratio — what bindsPropositions necessary to the decision. These bind every NCLT and NCLAT.
Holding 1 · answers Q1 · the bar reaches back

Our readingSection 10A is keyed to the date of default, not the date of filing. It catches applications already filed before 5 June 2020 — otherwise everyone who raced to court in the ten-week gap would strip debtors of the very protection Parliament built (Para 23).

The Court · Para 23“The expression “shall ever be filed” is a clear indicator that the intent of the legislature is to bar the institution of any application for the commencement of the CIRP in respect of a default which has occurred on or after 25 March 2020…”
The Court · Para 23“it would leave a whole class of corporate debtors where the default has occurred on or after 25 March 2020 outside the pale of protection because the application was filed before 5 June 2020”
Holding 2 · answers Q2 · your form binds you

Our readingThe default date declared in the Form 3 demand notice is the applicant’s anchor: having named 30 April 2020, he could not re-date the default to January or March to slip out of the window (Paras 9–10).

The Court · Para 9“The date of default is crystalized as 30 April 2020 in the demand notice issued by the appellant in Form 3”
The Court · Para 10“This attempt to set back the date of default to either 21 January 2020 or 23 March 2020 is plainly untenable for the reason that it is contrary to the disclosure made by the appellant in the demand notice”
Holding 3 · answers Q3 · no COVID inquest

Our readingThe protection is class-wide and blunt by design: no tribunal is to investigate whether the pandemic actually caused the particular default. Parliament chose a date, not a causation test (Para 25).

The Court · Para 25“Section 10A does not contain any requirement that the Adjudicating Authority must launch into an enquiry into whether, and if so to what extent, the financial health of the corporate debtor was affected by the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic.”
Holding 4 · the limit · the debt survives

Our readingSection 10A closes one door, not the claim: the debt is not extinguished and every ordinary recovery route — suit, arbitration, other fora — stays open (Para 24).

The Court · Para 24“the retrospective bar on the filing of applications for the commencement of CIRP during the stipulated period does not extinguish the debt owed by the corporate debtor or the right of creditors to recover it”
Holding 5 · the method, and the outcome

Our readingWhere text is ambiguous, purpose governs: the recitals of the Ordinance (lockdown, stressed businesses, missing resolution applicants) fix the meaning, and the initiation-versus-commencement distinction (ss. 5(11)–(12)) changes nothing. The NCLAT’s view stands; appeal dismissed (Paras 25–27).

The Court · Para 25“the embargo contained in Section 10A must receive a purposive construction which will advance the object which was sought to be achieved by enacting the provision”
The Court · Para 27“We affirm the conclusion of the NCLAT. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”
A note on the window’s edges: s. 10A protects defaults arising 25.03.2020 onwards for the notified period (extended by notifications up to one year, to 24.03.2021) — and its explanation expressly keeps pre-25.03.2020 defaults fully actionable: “the provisions of this section shall not apply to any default committed under the said sections before 25th March, 2020” (s. 10A, quoted at Para 6). The proviso’s “shall ever be filed” makes the bar permanent for window defaults — but says nothing about defaults that continue or recur after the window closes; that frontier is fought case-by-case on fresh default dates.
Bar · 4

Why the Court got there — three moves

1 · Read the law with its birth certificate. The Ordinance’s recitals — a lockdown “in force since 25th March, 2020”, businesses stressed “for reasons beyond their control”, resolution applicants nowhere to be found — are treated as the key to its meaning, on the authority of a Constitution Bench (Paras 15, 21).

2 · Tense is not destiny. “Shall be filed” sounds future-facing, but “the language of the provision is not always decisive” of prospectivity — the dominant legislative intention controls, and here the chosen cut-off (the lockdown date itself) tells you everything (Paras 21–22).

3 · Purpose completes the circle. A filing-date reading would create a perverse race: petitions rushed in before 5 June would defeat the shield precisely for the class it was made to protect. Purposive construction — anchored in Swiss Ribbons’ vision of the Code as a rescue statute — closes that gap (Paras 23, 25).

“It would leave a whole class of corporate debtors where the default has occurred on or after 25 March 2020 outside the pale of protection because the application was filed before 5 June 2020.” — Para 23: the single sentence that decided the case — and every s. 10A fight since.
▲ Rise when ready
“You can now run the window on any default. But two over-readings of this judgment are loose in the market — one that thinks COVID-period debts were forgiven, and one that invites tribunals to hold COVID inquests. Do you know them?”
Take the Bench ↓ or stop here — you can already cite this case correctly, which is more than most.
Seat three · the craft · what even seniors miss

The Bench

The judge’s seat. From here you see what neither side tells you: where this judgment is stretched beyond its words, and how both sides of a s. 10A fight should actually use it.

Bench · 1

The two over-readings that catch even seniors

We read the certified copy end to end so you don’t repeat what the summaries got wrong. Both findings are checkable by anyone with the PDF.

Over-reading 1 · the loan waiver that never was

“Section 10A extinguished COVID-period debts”

Wrong. The bar “does not extinguish the debt owed by the corporate debtor or the right of creditors to recover it”. Only the IBC door closed — suits, arbitration and every ordinary recovery route stayed open, and the ₹104-crore claim in this very case survived the dismissal.

The move: when a debtor waves s. 10A as a discharge, hand up Para 24 — the shield stops CIRP, nothing else. Advise the creditor client accordingly before limitation runs on the ordinary remedy.

✓ verified against certified copy · Para 24
Over-reading 2 · the COVID inquest

“The bar applies only to genuinely COVID-caused defaults”

Wrong — in both directions. The tribunal holds no causation inquiry: the protection covers a default dated in the window even if COVID had nothing to do with it (as the appellant argued, in vain, of this ₹104-crore claim rooted in a January resignation) — and no creditor can defeat the bar by proving the debtor’s distress predated the pandemic.

The move: strike causation evidence as irrelevant — Para 25. The only triable fact is the date of default; spend every page there.

✓ verified against certified copy · Para 25
Bench · 2

Citing it — from both sides of a s. 10A fight

A judgment is a tool with two edges. From the Bench you must see both — you will not always be on the same side of it.

For the creditor

Keeping the Code’s door open — or choosing another
  1. Date the default with care, before Form 3: the date you declare binds you — re-dating later is “plainly untenable” (Paras 9–10). If the true default predates 25.03.2020, say so from the first document.
  2. Use the explanation: pre-lockdown defaults are expressly outside s. 10A — the Code remains fully open for them (s. 10A explanation, quoted at Para 6).
  3. A barred petition is not a dead claim: pivot to suit or arbitration — the debt and “the right of creditors to recover it” survive (Para 24). Watch limitation while you pivot.
  4. For continuing defaults: the proviso kills window defaults forever — so build your next filing on a fresh, post-window default date, cleanly documented.

For the corporate debtor

Raising the shield — at its true width
  1. Check the date first: default declared on or after 25.03.2020 → absolute bar — even for petitions filed before 5 June 2020 (Para 23).
  2. Hold the creditor to its own form: the Form 3 disclosure is an anchor no later affidavit can lift (Para 10).
  3. The proviso is forever: for window defaults, “no application shall ever be filed” — not suspended, extinguished as a CIRP trigger (s. 10A proviso, quoted at Para 6; Para 23).
  4. Know the shield’s limits: it is IBC-only (Para 24) — prepare for the recovery suit that follows, and don’t argue COVID causation you don’t need (Para 25).
Bench · 3

Run the s. 10A window on your own brief

Four questions — the same test the Court applied Answer for the petition in front of you; the conclusion updates as you go.

Is it a CIRP application under s. 7, 9 or 10 against the corporate debtor?s. 10A opens “Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 7, 9 and 10” — it suspends only these

Did the default (as declared in the demand notice / petition) arise on or after 25 March 2020?the explanation keeps earlier defaults fully actionable (quoted at Para 6)

Does it also fall within the notified window (25.03.2020 up to 24.03.2021 as extended)?Para 16 — six months “or such further period, not exceeding one year”

Is the date you are relying on the same one disclosed in the Form 3 / petition?Para 10 — re-dating against your own disclosure is “plainly untenable”

Pending

Answer the four questions to see whether the s. 10A bar bites.

Illustrative aid only — the window’s outer edge depends on the extension notifications in force for the relevant period, and the facts always need counsel’s assessment.